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REVISITING THE RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING AFTER
GARCIA V. DOES
CALEB HAYES-DEATS

1.

INTRODUCTION

During the fall of 2014, First Amendment Law Review published Demonstrators'Right to FairWarning, which identified a right
that multiple circuits had attributed to demonstrators, discussed
three possible constitutional foundations for that right, and ultimate-

ly argued that courts should regard it as a narrowed form of First
Amendment review.' As the article went to press, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an opinion, Garcia v.
Does, 2 which was broadly consistent with the article's ultimate ar-

gument.3 On February 23, 2015, however, the Second Circuit reversed course, withdrawing its prior opinion and issuing a new one
that reached the opposite conclusion.4
The final opinion in Garcia creates a split among the circuits.

Whereas the Seventh and Tenth Circuits agree that demonstrators'
right to fair warning is "clearly established"-indeed, so evident that
"a defense of immunity would fail even in the absence of a precedent
B.A. 2006, Amherst College; J.D. 2011, Columbia Law School; currently, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York The ideas set forth
in this Article are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice, or any component thereof.
1 Caleb Hayes-Deats, Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning, 13 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 140 (2014). For the sake of brevity, familiarity with Demonstrators'Right to
FairWarning is presumed.
2 764 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014), withdrawn 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
3 Id.; see also Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 163-64 n.128.
4 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
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that had established the illegality of the defendants' conduct" 5-the
Second Circuit has now reached the opposite conclusion. In the
words of the Second Circuit, the decisions reached by the Seventh
and Tenth Circuits "agree[d] on neither the constitutional right at
stake nor its contours" and extended the primary precedent on
which they relied "beyond its due process holding." 6 These circuits'
profoundly different conclusions emerge from the general uncertainty over the proper constitutional basis for demonstrators' right to
fair warning.7 As described below, whereas the Second Circuit regarded the right to fair warning as a due process right that extended
only to cases of explicit permission,8 the Seventh Circuit's approach
envisioned a greater role for the First Amendment in the analysis. 9
The discrepancy between the Second, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits highlights the analytical ambiguities that motivated Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning. Accordingly, this short follow-up
piece examines the newfound circuit split that has developed and
updates the earlier analysis. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part
II discusses Garcia, its holding, and its disagreements with earlier
decisions. Part III analyzes one respect in which Garcia corroborates
the analysis in Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning. Specifically, it
outlines how Garcia supports two of the earlier article's conclusions:
(1) that the different potential constitutional foundations for demonstrators' right to fair warning would each create a right of different
scope; and (2) that a right to fair warning grounded in the Due Process Clause would not protect demonstrators who had received only
implicit permission for their conduct.' 0 Finally, Part IV examines the

primary challenge Garcia poses to the analysis in Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning, namely, its conclusion that demonstrators'

s Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Buck v.
City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2008).
6 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12.
7 See generally Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 175-202 (discussing why the Due
Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment might and
might not provide the constitutional foundation for demonstrators' right to fair
warning).
8 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95.
9 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 749-50; see also Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 188-91.
10 Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 144-45, 209-12.
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right to fair warning is grounded in the Due Process Clause, rather
than the First Amendment.
11. GARCIA v. DOES
On October 1, 2011, thousands of Occupy Wall Street protestors gathered for a march from Zuccotti Park, in Manhattan, to
Brooklyn Bridge Park, in Brooklyn-a route that would take them
across the Brooklyn Bridge." During the early portions of the march,
police officers directed the demonstrators' movements, at times even
instructing the demonstrators to "proceed in ways ordinarily prohibited under traffic regulations."1 2 When the demonstrators reached
the Manhattan entrance to the Brooklyn Bridge, a bottleneck formed
because the portion of the bridge reserved for pedestrians was significantly narrower than the streets on which demonstrators had
proceeded. Initially, police officers formed a line across the bridge's
vehicular entrance, preventing demonstrators from marching onto
the portion of the bridge reserved for cars.' 3 As the demonstrators
continued to arrive at the bottleneck, one police officer stepped forward and used a bullhorn to warn demonstrators that those on the
vehicular roadway were "obstructing traffic" and "subject to arrest."1 4 All but a few demonstrators could not hear this warning.' 5
Subsequently, "the officers ... turned around and began walking unhurriedly onto the [Brooklyn] Bridge roadway with their backs to
the protestors."' 6 A class of demonstrators alleged that they understood this action by the officers to constitute an "actual and apparent
grant of permission to follow," particularly given that officers had instructed demonstrators to proceed in ways that violated traffic regulations at earlier points during the march.' 7 Thus, the plaintiffs con" Garcia, 779 F.3d at 88.
12

Id.

"3

Id.

14 Id. at 89.
15 Id.; see also Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2011) (find-

ing that a bullhorn was "no mechanism ...
sands of people").
16 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 89.
17 Id.

for conveying a command to thou-
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tended that officers had not provided the requisite fair warning
when, half-way across the bridge, the officers stopped, blocked the
movements of over 700 demonstrators who had followed them, and
arrested them for obstructing traffic.18
The Second Circuit disagreed. Rather than addressing the
demonstrators' argument that officers had violated their right to fair
warning, the Second Circuit concluded that any such right was not so
clearly established as to overcome officers' defense of qualified immunity.1 9 According to the Second Circuit, Cox v. Louisiana,20 the
primary Supreme Court case on point, established only that "demonstrators or others who have been advised by the police that their behavior is lawful may not be punished for that behavior." 21 Cox had
involved an "explicit consultation between the leaders of the demonstration and the police about what conduct would be permitted," and
thus did not address what constitutional protections would apply
where demonstrators had inferred implicit permission from officers'
actions. 22 Because the class of demonstrators did not allege that they
had "heard any statement from any police officer authorizing the
protestors to cross the Bridge via the vehicular roadway," 23 the Second Circuit could conclude only that "the officers were confronted
with ambiguities of fact and law." 2 4 Such ambiguity could not invalidate the arrests, for which the officers otherwise had probable cause,
because an affirmative defense could defeat probable cause only
where an officer "deliberately disregard[s] facts known to him which
establish justification." 25
The Second Circuit carefully limited the scope of its holding,
explaining that it had no occasion to consider whether the demon18 Id.
19 Id. at 93.
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Garcia, 779 F.3d at 96 (emphasis added).
22Id. at 95.
23 Id.; see also id. at 94 ("The Complaint ...
[is] devoid of any evidence that any
police officer made any gesture or spoke any word that unambiguously authorized the protesters to continue to block traffic, and indeed the Complaint does
not allege that any of the plaintiffs observed any such gesture.").
24
Id. at 96.
25 Id. at 93 (emphasis added) (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 136 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
20
21
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strators had a right to fair warning that would have, as it had in Cox,
provided a defense against conviction for obstructing traffic. 2 6 Thus,
it ostensibly left open the question of whether demonstrators had a
right to fair warning in cases of implicit permission. But in holding
that demonstrators' right to fair warning was not clearly established
in cases of implicit permission-and, more broadly, that the right
factored into the analysis only as an affirmative defense against conviction, rather than a prohibition on arrest-the Second Circuit departed markedly from the approaches of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, each of which concluded that the right 'to fair warning was
clearly established in cases of implicit permission. 27 In fact, the Second Circuit acknowledged its disagreement with the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits, stating that it believed those courts' opinions had "extend[ed] Cox beyond its due process holding" and "agree[d] on neither the constitutional right at stake nor its contours." 28
While the disagreement between the Second and Seventh
Circuits primarily concerns whether demonstrators' right to fair
warning is clearly established, such that it overcomes officers' defense of qualified immunity, that disagreement appears to result
from a more fundamental divergence over the nature of the right. 29
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
First Amendment had required officers to grant demonstrators exceptions from otherwise applicable traffic laws.30 This requirement
informed the Seventh Circuit's understanding of what the officers
Id. ("We are not concerned with whether plaintiffs' asserted belief that the
officers' behavior had given them implied permission to violate traffic laws otherwise banning pedestrians from the roadway would constitute a defense to the
charge of disorderly conduct; that issue would be presented to a court adjudicating the criminal charges against plaintiffs."); see also id. at 96 ("The extent of
[Cox's defense] is less than clear, and we need not decide here how far it might
extend.").
27 Id. at 95-96, 95 n.12; see also Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 746-47
(7th Cir. 2011); Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1286-87 (10th Cir.
2008); Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 164-69.
28 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12.
29 For the sake of simplicity, this Article will focus on the differences between
the Second and Seventh Circuits. As noted above, the Tenth Circuit's decision is
consistent with the Seventh's.
broadly
30
See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 749-50.
26
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policing the march had permitted demonstrators to do.31 Effectively,
because officers had not insisted that demonstrators specify a route
to which they would adhere, the Seventh Circuit placed the burden of
ambiguity on officers, interpreting them to have permitted anything
they had not clearly proscribed by, for example, "prepar[ing] in advance reasonable measures for preventing the demonstration from
spilling over the boundaries of the authorized march."32 This approach collapsed the distinction between explicit and implicit permission that the Second Circuit has since emphasized. Effectively, the
Seventh Circuit found that, because officers had explicitly permitted
the demonstrators to march, they had further permitted the demonstrators to be in any location that the officers had not clearly told
them to avoid. Thus, the Seventh Circuit could find that demonstrators' right to fair warning would be "clearly established" even in the
absence of controlling precedent because notice was required to limit the scope of permission:
No precedent should be necessary . . . to establish
that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the police to say to a person go ahead and march and then,
five minutes later, having revoked the permission for
the march without notice to anyone, arrest the person for having marched without police permission.33
In other words, the Seventh and Second Circuits' diverging conclusions on the issue of whether demonstrators' right to fair warning
was clearly established resulted from earlier analytical choices, including the choice of which constitutional provisions to emphasize.
Additionally, the split over whether demonstrators' right to
fair warning was clearly established was influenced by the courts'
differing understanding of how that right functioned procedurally.
Whereas the Second Circuit regarded the right to fair warning as an
affirmative defense that demonstrators could invoke in a criminal
trial, the Seventh Circuit characterized it as a limitation on officers'
conduct, i.e., an obligation officers had to analyze whether they had
See Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 189-91.
Vodak, 639 F.3d at 750; see also Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 168-69.
33 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746-47. While the Seventh Circuit indicated that it would
have reached the same conclusion in the absence of controlling precedent, it also emphasized that it believed that Cox compelled the result it reached.
31
32
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to thousands of people."
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for conveying a command

The Second Circuit's approach led it to

emphasize officers' limited abilities to predict how courts will later
decide an open legal issue.35 The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, focused
on facts that would have been obvious to officers, such as their ability to perceive that not all demonstrators had heard the bullhorn and
their ignorance of what other warnings demonstrators might have
received. 36 Thus, the divergence between the Second and Seventh
Circuits over whether demonstrators' right to fair warning is clearly
established followed from their very different views about the nature of the right in question.
The circuit split described above both supports and challenges the analysis from Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning. On
the one hand, the disagreement concerning the nature and scope of
the right to fair warning supports the claims (1) that multiple constitutional provisions could plausibly provide the right's foundation
and (2) that the choice between those provisions affects the right's
scope. On the other hand, the Second Circuit's conclusion that Cox establishes only a narrow "due process holding" challenges the argument that demonstrators' right to fair warning is actually a narrowed form of First Amendment review that courts apply to officers'
conduct in order to avoid invalidating problematic statutory
schemes. The remainder of this Article addresses these issues.
Ill. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORIGIN OF DEMONSTRATORS'
RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning argued that
"[g]rounding the right to fair warning in the Due Process Clause
would raise severe doubts about whether the right applies to demonstrators who have received only implicit permission." 37 As articulated in Raley v. Ohio,38 a right to fair warning under the Due Process Clause originates from a prohibition on the "indefensible sort of
34 Id. at 746.

Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84,96 (2d Cir. 2015).
Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
37 Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 211.
38 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
3s
36
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entrapment" that occurs when a state convicts someone "for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to
him."3 9 Because a right to fair warning grounded in the First

Amendment would protect demonstrators who receive only implicit
permission,40 Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning concluded that
the constitutional provision that courts identify as the basis for demonstrators' right to fair warning has important implications for the
right's scope.4 ' The contrast between Garcia and Vodak strongly
supports each of these arguments.
Several aspects of the Second Circuit's opinion in Garcia indicate that it regarded the Due Process Clause as the foundation of
demonstrators' right to fair warning. First and foremost, the Second
Circuit described Cox as establishing a "due process holding." 4 2 Other

aspects of the Second Circuit's opinion further indicate that the court
grounded demonstrators' right to fair warning in the Due Process
Clause. As described above, Garciaregarded the right to fair warning
as a defense against criminal conviction, rather than as a limitation
on officers' conduct.4 3 This characterization evokes Cox's discussion
of Raley v. Ohio and "indefensible ... entrapment." 44 Courts have interpreted the defense recognized in Raley extremely narrowly, requiring defendants to demonstrate that responsible officials "clearly
told" them their conduct was permissible. 45 Garcia followed this approach, holding that the defense it perceived would defeat probable
cause only if demonstrators could show that a "police officer made
a[] gesture or spoke a[] word that unambiguously authorized protestors to continue to block traffic." 46 Thus, Garcia characterized the

right to fair warning as a due process defense against entrapment,
one that existed only where permission was unambiguous.
In Vodak, the Seventh Circuit took a markedly different view
of demonstrators' right to fair warning. Rather than evaluating
Id. at 425-26; see also Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 211-12.
Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 209-11.
Id. at 145, 216-17.
42 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 95 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015).
43 Id. at 93.
44 Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(iv)(2001).
45 Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26; see generally Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 178-79.
46 Garcia,779 F.3d at 94 (emphasis added).
3

40
41
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whether officers had explicitly permitted demonstrators' specific
conduct, the Seventh Circuit noted that the First Amendment had required officers to permit demonstrators to protest spontaneously in
response to the United States' invasion of Iraq. 4 7 Because officers had
generally permitted the demonstration, as required by the First
Amendment, the Seventh Circuit focused on whether they had effectively revoked permission prior to making arrests by clearly communicating the requirements they sought to impose and giving demonstrators an opportunity to comply. 48 The Seventh Circuit's analanalysis recalls Cox's discussion of what effect to give to a dispersal
order that the Supreme Court determined had not complied with the
First Amendment. 49 In Cox, as in Vodak, officers had initially granted
permission that they later sought to revoke. Each court thus had to
determine whether officers' attempts to revoke their earlier grant of
permission had complied with the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that revocation was constitutional only where "police had
... good reason to believe [demonstrators] knew they were violating
a police order."5 0 Thus, focusing on the First Amendment led the
Seventh Circuit to ask not whether officers had explicitly permitted
demonstrators to march in the place where arrests had occurredsomething officers had not done "unambiguously" 5 1-but instead
whether officers could reasonably believe that demonstrators
"knew" that their conduct was excluded from officers' earlier, more
general grant of permission. 52
The discussion above demonstrates that the Second and Seventh Circuits' answers to the question of whether demonstrators had
a clearly established right to fair warning largely followed from how
each court had framed that question, and in particular from the constitutional provision that influenced each court's understanding of
Cox's right to fair warning. Whereas Garcia considered whether officers could reasonably anticipate a permission-based affirmative de-

47

Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 749 (7th Cir. 2011).

Id. at 746-47.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 572 (1965).
50 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
s1 See Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 168-69, 189.
48

49

52Id.
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fense that demonstrators might invoke,5 Vodak asked whether officers could reasonably believe that they had revoked their earlier
permission in a constitutionally acceptable manner.5 4 The courts'
emphases on different constitutional provisions created these differences. Because a due process defense exists only in cases of "unambiguous" permission, the Second Circuit asked whether officers had
explicitly permitted the behavior for which they arrested demonstrators.5 5 In contrast, according to the Seventh Circuit, the First

Amendment required officers to permit demonstrators to protest,
and the court thus held officers responsible for any ambiguity about
the scope of that compelled permission.5 6 Moreover, because cases
recognizing a due process right to fair warning typically treated that
right as a defense against conviction, the Second Circuit viewed the
right as such in Garcia.57 In contrast, by focusing on the First
Amendment, the Seventh Circuit regarded the right to fair warning
as a set of limitations on officers' ability to revoke or limit permission.58 Thus, the constitutional provisions the Second and Seventh
Circuits chose to emphasize led them to regard demonstrators' right
to fair warning very differently, effectively determining their divergent answers to the question of whether the right to fair warning
was clearly established in the analogous circumstances they faced.
Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning foresaw the possibility of such
divergence, 59 and that possibility motivated the Article's efforts to
resolve the ambiguity over the origins of the right to fair warning.
IV. LOCATING THE RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
Having analyzed the support that the newfound circuit split
provides for the arguments set forth in Demonstrators'Right to Fair
Warning, consideration now turns to the principal challenge Garcia
presents to those arguments. Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning
s3 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2015).
54 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
ss Garcia,779 F.3d at 95.
56 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745.
57 See Garcia,779 F.3d at 94.
sB See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
59 See Hayes-Deats, supranote 1, at 140-41.
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contended that cases vindicating the right to fair warning, including
Cox v. Louisiana, applied a narrowed form of First Amendment review, one designed to avoid striking down problematic statutes, as
the First Amendment would normally require, while still affording
demonstrators full First Amendment protection, including the ability
to protest spontaneously in response to current events. 60 Garcia v.
Does, in contrast, held that Cox established only a narrow "due process holding," 6 1 namely, that "demonstrators or others who have
been advised by the police that their behavior is lawful may not be
punished for that behavior." 62 This reading of Cox calls the central
argument of Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning into question. Accordingly, Part IV considers Garcia's interpretation of Cox and its implications for the right to fair warning.
The perceived conflict between Garcia and Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning might strike some readers as imagined, rather
than real. After all, Demonstrators'Right to Fair Warning argued that
ambiguity surrounded both the constitutional origin of demonstrators' right to fair warning and, consequently, its scope. 63 Such an argument appears consistent with Garcia'sconclusion that the right to
fair warning did not unambiguously prohibit arrests in the circumstances presented. 64 Nonetheless, that apparent consistency is misleading. To overcome a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff
must show that existing precedent clearly establishes that an arrest
is unconstitutional, not why an arrest is unconstitutional. The constitutional basis for a right, then, is irrelevant to a qualified immunity
defense if existing precedent recognizes the right with sufficient
specificity. As described below, and as the Seventh Circuit has held,
Cox clearly established that, where officers had permitted a demonstration, they had an obligation to revoke permission in a manner
that complied with the Constitution. 6s
60

See Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 202-14.
Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12.
Id. at 96.
63
See Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 144-47.
64 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 96.
65 In fact, existing Second Circuit precedent had discussed the limitations the
First Amendment placed on officers policing a demonstration. See Papineau v.
Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2006). Specifically, Papineau held that the
61
62
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The most striking aspect of Garcia's interpretation of Cox is
what it ignores. In Cox, while officers initially "advised" demonstrators that "their behavior [was] lawful," they subsequently changed
course, ordering the demonstrators to disperse. 66 Far from relying
on officers' permission, then, "appellant Cox defied the [dispersal]
order by telling the crowd not to move." 67 Thus, as the dissent emphasized, a right based solely on explicit permission would not have
protected demonstrators, who continued their demonstration even
after the explicit revocation of permission. 68 The majority in Cox
dealt with the dispersal order not on due process grounds, but instead by holding that, under the First Amendment, the officers had
not provided a "valid reason" for revoking the permission they had
extended. 69 By ignoring the dispersal order, and the Cox majority's
treatment of it, Garcia overlooked the importance of the First
Amendment to Cox's holding and to the right to fair warning it established. Cox established not only a due process right not to be arrested for conduct that officers had permitted, but also a right to have
permission revoked in a way that did not violate the First Amendment.70

Taking the dispersal order into account, Cox becomes much
more difficult to distinguish from Garcia. In Garcia, the officers did
not dispute that, by their conduct, they had permitted demonstrators
to march without a parade permit and to violate traffic laws that
First Amendment required even officers who had "a lawful basis to interfere
with [a] demonstration" to first provide a warning that would "'enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law."' Id. (quoting Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1950)). Garcia distinguished Papineau on the
ground that demonstrators did not "need[] permission from the police to engage in that protest." Garcia, 779 F.3d at 94 n.11. If, however, the Second Circuit
had asked whether officers in Garcia had satisfactorily revoked or limited their
prior permission to demonstrate, that distinction would have become inapposite.
66 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 572 (1965).
67 Id. at 582 (Black, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 583; see also id. at 587 (Clark, I., dissenting) ("The only way the court
can support its finding is to ignore the time limitation and hold-as it does sub
silentio-that once Cox and the 2,000 demonstrators were permitted to occupy
the sidewalk they could remain indefinitely.").
69 Id. at 572-73 (majority opinion).
70 Id. at 574.

194

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

would have otherwise applied. 7 ' By analyzing only whether officers
had explicitly permitted demonstrators to take the further step of
proceeding onto the Brooklyn Bridge's vehicular roadway, the Second Circuit avoided the question of whether officers had revoked or
limited their existing permission in a manner that complied with the
First Amendment, one of the principal points of disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Cox. Thus, Garcia unduly limited the scope of the right Cox had established. Because the demonstrators in Garcia had officers' undisputed permission to march,
either implicitly or explicitly, Cox established not only a due-process
right that demonstrators would have had if officers had explicitly
permitted them to continue their march on the Brooklyn Bridge's
vehicular roadway, but also a right to have officers revoke or limit
the permission they had already granted in a manner that complied
with the First Amendment.
Only two bases exist for distinguishing the Brooklyn Bridge's
vehicular roadway from the other locations where officers had permitted demonstrators to march, and thus from the apparent scope of
officers' existing permission: (1) the warning officers provided
through a bull horn; and (2) the intrusion of demonstrators into a
new, categorically different area. But these bases were the precise
distinctions that the Seventh and Tenth Circuits had rejected. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit had concluded that a bullhorn was "no
mechanism for conveying a command to thousands of people."7 2
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that officers had "sanctioned [a]
march" that spilled over into new areas "by closing off streets to traffic, [and] also by directing the progress and direction of the proces-

Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 88, 90 n.7 (2d Cir. 2015). Specifically, while the
officers argued before the district court that they had probable cause broadly to
arrest demonstrators for parading without a permit in violation of New York
City Administrative Code § 10-110(a), they abandoned that argument on appeal. Id. In doing so, the officers effectively acknowledged that, regardless of
whether they had explicitly informed demonstrators that they would not require a permit, they did not have probable cause to arrest each and every demonstrator, whether or not that demonstrator had proceeded onto to the
Brooklyn Bridge's vehicular roadway.
72 See Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2011).
71
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sion." 73 Thus, the two bases for distinguishing Garcia from Cox are
bases that other courts had already rejected.
Other First Amendment doctrines, in addition to Cox, indicate
that once officers have permitted a spontaneous demonstration, the
First Amendment significantly constrains their ability to revoke or
limit that permission. Nearly every circuit to have addressed the issue has held that the First Amendment requires statutory and regulatory schemes to permit spontaneous demonstrations in response
to developing events.7 4 But a right to demonstrate spontaneously

would mean little if demonstrators could exercise it only where officers had "beckon[ed] to [them] or state[d] by word or gesture that
they were welcome to proceed." 7 5 Prior cases, including Garcia, indicate that, rather than extending explicit permission, officers frequently permit spontaneous demonstrations simply by tolerating
them. 76 If officers who have implicitly permitted a march have probable cause to arrest demonstrators for any violation of the traffic
laws that they have not explicitly permitted, then many actions that
commonly occur in protests will subject demonstrators to potential
arrest.7 7 Indeed, First Amendment jurisprudence has long recog73 Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Compare

.

Garcia, 779 F.3d at 89 (noting that plaintiffs "allege that the combination of. .

officers in front 'leading' the protesters onto the roadway and the officers on
the side escorting them along the roadway led them to believe that the NYPD
was escorting and permitting the march to proceed onto the roadway, as it had
escorted and permitted the march through lower Manhattan earlier in the
day").
74 See Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 192-93 (citing decisions from the First,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
7s Garcia,779 F.3d at 90.
76 Id. at 88 ("Although no permit for the march had been sought, the [NYPD]
was aware of the planned event in advance, and NYPD officers escorted the
marchers...."); Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741 ("This waiver of the permit requirement
is informal; it seems to consist just in not telling the demonstrators that they
need a permit."); Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283 ("[O]fficers' conduct essentially
amounted to the grant of a defacto parade permit....").
77 For example, marching alongside a silent officer could subject a demonstrator to arrest if it later turned out that the officer did not intend to permit the
demonstrator to enter that particular roadway. Garcia, 779 F.3d at 89. Further
examples are easily generated. In New York, demonstrators could make "unreasonable noise" in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(2), "obstruct[ vehicular
or pedestrian traffic" in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(5), be "masked or
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nized a tension between the First Amendment and laws that protect
the public order, noting that demonstrating "best serve[s] its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."7 8
Permitting arrests for actions that routinely occur during a
demonstration would create a legal paradox: demonstrators would
have a right to spontaneously protest, but would face potential arrest for many of the actions that protesting entails. 79 This paradox
would erode the right to spontaneously demonstrate. First, as suggested above, demonstrators would not, in many instances, have a
right to engage in the specific actions necessary to effectuate their
broader right to demonstrate. Second, the uncertainty over the extent of demonstrators' right to spontaneously demonstrate would
chill the exercise of that right, since the demonstrators could foreclose the possibility of arrest only by not demonstrating.8 0 As a practical matter, the existence of a potential "defense to the charge" on
which officers arrested demonstrators would provide demonstrators
little reassurance.8 ' In many cases, prosecutors simply drop charges
against arrested demonstrators, obviating the need to present any
defense. 8 2 Moreover, even where charges are dropped, arrests can
have significant collateral consequences, inhibiting the arrestees' ac-

in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire or facial alteration" in
violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4), or "remain[] in or about school
grounds" in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(5).
7
8 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
79 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(2)(Consol. 2015)(criminalizing "unreasonable noise").
80 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (noting that the existence of a prohibition may cause individuals "to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression").
81 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 93.
82 See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Charges Are Dropped for 14 Demonstrators, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/
charges-are-dropped-for- 14-occupy-wall-street-protesters.html?_r=0. The possibility of dropping charges in order to avoid review of conduct's constitutionality might itself create First Amendment problems, as it generates opportunities
for discriminatory enforcement and deters conduct that the First Amendment
protects. See Hayes-Deats,supra note 1, at 2 17-18.
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cess to employment, credit, and housing.83 Thus, failing to protect
demonstrators from arrests for conduct they understood to be part
of demonstrating-or at least did not reasonably understand to have
been prohibited-would undercut the well-recognized right to spontaneously demonstrate.
A right to fair warning grounded in the First Amendment
avoids the paradox described above by applying the same First
Amendment principles to statutory regimes and officers' abilities to
revoke permissions and make arrests. As argued in Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning, past cases have effectively deployed the right
to fair warning as a narrowed form of First Amendment review that
avoids invalidating troublesome statutory schemes by focusing on
whether officers' conduct complies with applicable First Amendment
principles. 84 This approach results from a simple logic, even if courts
have not explained that logic clearly. If courts wish to forgo subjecting public order statutes to a searching First Amendment analysiseither because they do not believe the statutes can be more narrowly
tailored or because, in a given instance, officers have waived the
problematic prohibition-they cannot do so at the expense of demonstrators' First Amendment rights.8 5 Simply put, courts have recognized that, because demonstrators have a First Amendment right
to spontaneously protest, they must also have a First Amendment
right not to be arrested in a manner that would erode their broader
right or deter its exercise. 86
IV. CONCLUSION

As described above, the Second Circuit's decision in Garcia
has generated a circuit split that squarely presents the question of
83 See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-findconsequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 ("Many people who have never
faced charges, or have had charges dropped, find that a lingering arrest record
can ruin their chance to secure employment, loans and housing.").
84 See Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 202-19.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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what constitutional provision creates demonstrators' right to fair
warning and how far that right extends. Only the Supreme Court can
conclusively resolve this question. Although the emergence of a circuit split supports some of the analysis advanced in Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning, it impugns that Article's central argument.
This short response has contended that Garcia's interpretation of
demonstrators' right to fair warning is unpersuasive.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Second Circuit's divergence from
the past cases that have considered demonstrators' right to fair
warning appears influenced not by its reading of those past cases,
discussions of which are largely confined to footnotes, 87 as much as
by its interpretation of the Supreme Court's recent qualified immunity jurisprudence. In reaching its holding, the Second Circuit cited
four qualified immunity decisions that the Supreme Court has issued
since 2011.88 To the extent that the Second Circuit understood those
cases to indicate that courts should give the narrowest possible interpretation to the constitutional rights plaintiffs invoke, upholding
qualified immunity defenses wherever defendants have a colorable
argument that existing precedent has not clearly established the
constitutional right at issue, 9 the Circuit's reasoning and outcome
raise a troubling possibility. As described above, the Second Circuit's
conclusion that the right was not "clearly established" followed from
its characterization of the right itself. In the future, that characterization will influence not only cases that consider qualified immunity
defenses, but also any other case involving demonstrators' right to
fair warning, including cases where demonstrators raise the right to
fair warning as a defense to a criminal charge. To the extent cases
that do not involve qualified immunity adopt the Second Circuit's
narrowed view of demonstrators' right to fair warning, the Supreme
Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence will have altered the apparent trajectory of that right's development. This phenomenon
could potentially occur more generally, raising the question of
See Garcia, 779 F.3d at 94-95 nn.11-12.
Id. at 95-97 & n.12 (citing Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014); Reichle v.
Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235
(2012); Ashcroftv. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011)).
89 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12 (requiring that "the question at issue" be "beyond
debate" (quoting al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083)).
87

88
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whether the narrow interpretations courts give when considering
whether constitutional rights are "clearly established" emanate beyond the qualified immunity jurisprudence, narrowing or even eroding constitutional rights in other contexts.90

90 Cf Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity, 113 MIcH. L. REV. 1219, 1248-49 (2015) (arguing that "qualified

immunity" jurisprudence has become "a mechanism to stunt the development
of constitutional rights").

